Introduction
Niścaya is generally considered to mean cognition or a cognitional function that relates to determining an object, and is regularly translated as "determination," "ascertainment," or "judgment," among other similar terms. According to common understanding, this kind of cognition implies a choice between contradictory alternatives that are created through conceptual construction. This close relation between niścaya and conceptual construction has been often discussed both inside and outside of Buddhism. However, for Dharmakīrti, who defined perception (pratyakṣa) as non-conceptual and non-erroneous cognition, niścaya cannot be a function of perceptual cognition. In fact, he states that perception does not possess the function of niścaya in the context of ascertaining cognition (niścayapratyaya), which is known as "perceptual judgment" and is a conceptual cognition that occurs immediately after perception and involves ascertaining the perception's contents.
1)
However, in the third chapter of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika (PV), there are some occurrences of the word niścaya that might refer to perceptual functions. This usage is derived from Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) 1.9b, but later commentators have interpreted this in various ways. In this paper, I will examine Dharmakīrti's theory, comparing PV with his later opus, Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin).
2) yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ, tadā svasaṃvedanānurūpam arthaṃ pratipadyata iṣṭam aniṣṭaṃ vā.
What is the ground [for the statement that self-awareness is a result of the means of valid cognition]?
It is because the determination of the object conforms to 3) it (i.e., self-awareness). (PS 1.9b) [To explain:] because when the object (artha) is a cognition possessing an object (viṣaya), then one cognizes the object as desirable or undesirable in conformity with self-awareness.
In PSV, Dignāga explains PS's relevant phrase, arthaniścaya (meaning "determination of the object"), in the following manner: He first paraphrases the "determination" (niścaya) as "cognition" (pratipatti) and then adds the modifying phrase, "desirable or undesirable" (iṣṭam aniṣṭaṃ vā), to the "object" (artha). Now, we have a question: What is the relation between the self-awareness that is an aspect (i.e., the result of the means of valid cognition) of perception and the determination of the object that conforms (anurūpa) to this self-awareness? There are two possible answers: (1) They are functions of the same perceptual cognition, or (2) they are functions of different cognitions; that is, self-awareness belongs to a perception while the determination belongs to a conceptual cognition that is produced after this perception. Let us keep these two possibilities in mind.
4)

Dharmakīrti's Interpretations of PS 1.9b in His PV and PVin
It is to be noted that Dharmakīrti interprets PS 1.9b from two different standpoints: the Yogācāra perspective, i.e., as a phenomenologist characterized by the principles of "consciousness-only," and the Sautrāntika perspective, admitting the existence of external objects. Hence, in the following sections I will respectively examine how Dharmakīrti interprets PS 1.9b from these two viewpoints.
Yogācāra Viewpoint
Here, I assume that both PV 3.339 and 340 have originated from the Yogācāra standpoint, which is in conformity with PVin 1, 36,8-11. Dharmakīrti updated these two verses by adding the particle hi, which indicates the logical connection between them, and rephrased the expression of the Yogācāra standpoint.
5)
The portions of PV and
PVin that correspond to PS 1.9b is as follows: Dharmakīrti seems here to interpret the phrase tadrūpa in PS without taking into account the information in PSV, 6) and states that the determination (viniścaya) of the object is precisely a form of self-awareness. Therefore, here it is likely that he understands the determination of the object as a perceptual function that is nonconceptual, just like self-awareness. It is also remarkable that viniścaya in PV is replaced by pratipatti in PVin, which is a much more likely term to be used in the context of perception.
Sautrāntika Viewpoint
In regard to the Sautrāntika viewpoint, PV 3.341-345 and PVin 1, 36,11-37,4 correspond to Dharmakīrti's interpretation of PS 1.9b and PSV. There are two parts that can be treated as paraphrases of PS 1.9b, although they do not show a word-to-word correspondence as clearly as in the section on the Yogācāra viewpoint. In these two passages from PV, which include the yathā-clause, the phrase tadrūpa in PS seems to be interpreted by referring to PSV, which is in contrast to the interpretation discussed in section 2.1. Another noteworthy point is that the word (vi)niścaya in PV is replaced by niṣpatti, vyavasthiti, or pratīti in PVin. Of these, vyavasthiti is the expression most typically used to mention the result of the means of valid cognition (pramāṇaphala) in the case of perception.
7)
（220） Niścaya as a Perceptual Function（Miyo） ─ 1258 ─
Niścaya as a Conceptual Function in PV and PVin
We have confirmed that expressions similar to niścaya in PV that might refer to a perceptual function are replaced with more appropriate words in PVin. Nevertheless, in PV 3.347, a usage of niścaya that clearly refers to a conceptual function within the same context can also be found. Here, niścīyate is expected to represent the function of conceptual cognition because the particle iti usually indicates the content of a conceptual cognition. This is also The verb prathate ("appear"), as a function of self-awareness itself, provides a clear contrast to niścīyate, a function of conceptual cognition that occurs as a result of this self-awareness (ātmasaṃvidaḥ). The causal process described in the above two quotations can be illustrated as follows:
artha ⇒ ātmasaṃvid (= arthasaṃvid, arthasthiti 9) ) ⇒ "niviṣṭo 'sāv evam" ity arthaniścayaḥ a. object b. perceptual cognition c. conceptual cognition ("⇒" indicates causal relationship, and the cause and result are not contemporaneous)
It is interesting to note that in PVin, Dharmakīrti omits the part corresponding to PV 3.347, and this might be due to his intention to simplify the discourse by excluding references to ascertaining cognition.
However, we cannot disregard the phrase kāryatas in PVin,
10)
which is newly added in and Jinendrabuddhi also quotes this
PVin mentioning the causal relation between the self-awareness and the ascertainment of the object.
12)
On the other hand, Jñānaśrībhadra advances the second alternative.
13)
The second interpretation is rather in harmony with the following PVin 1.42 (= PV 3.351), which states that the object is also a cause of cognition (jñānasya hetur artho 'pi), and supports my argument that PVin here is inclined to exclude discussion about ascertaining cognition.
Conclusion
Among the two possibilities suggested in section 1 concerning the relation between self-awareness and determination (niścaya) in PS 1.9b, Dharmakīrti adopts, at least in PV 3.339cd, the first interpretation: that both belong to the same perception. It follows that the word niścaya is applied not only to the decisive function of conceptual cognition, but also to the non-conceptual function of perception. Moreover, in PVin, Dharmakīrti replaces the word (vi)niścaya with a different word that has a connotation more related to perception, such as pratipatti, niṣpatti, pratīti, or vyavasthiti. This was probably in order to remove a problematic usage of the word niścaya.
Concurrently, niścaya is certainly used in PV 3.347 to refer to the conceptual function of ascertaining cognition. Therefore, it is also possible to interpret the whole usage of niścaya in this context as referring to this function.
14)
Even in PVin, where the use of the word niścaya is cautiously avoided, this conceptual function of niścaya is involved in the discourse, depending on the first interpretation of kāryatas. If, on the other hand, we accept the second interpretation that refers to the causal relation between the object and perceptual cognition, it follows that Dharmakīrti in PVin reconstructs the content of PS 1.9b without referring to the conceptual ascertainment. 2）Kataoka (2011) has previously discussed Dharmakīrti's interpretation of PS 1.9, but the originality of my research is that I conduct an attentive comparison among PS, PV, and PVin. For a Japanese translation from Tibetan of the relevant section in PVin, see Tosaki (1993) . 3）Following its usage in PSV, I have considered rūpa in PS 1.9b to be equivalent to anurūpa, which means "conforming to." However, if only PS, without PSV, is taken into account, it is also possible to translate it as "having the nature of." Dharmakīrti uses the second interpretation in PV 3.339, which is considered in section 2.2.
4）Teraishi (1993, 212) and Harada (1999, 30, fn. 14) employ the first possibility and accept the function of niścaya in perception. Hattori (1968, 103, n. 62 ) also seems to think in the same way. Moriyama (2008, 208-211) .
9）Arthasthiti ("establishment") here expresses the same notion as arthavyavasthiti ("differentiation," "establishment by difference") discussed in section 2.2. 
